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SECRETARY OF WAR.
It is not a little remarkable that the power exerted by our
national judges to declare whether an act of Congress neces-
sarily involved in a litigation before them constitutes a valid
rule of action, should have appeared in full vigor very shortly
after the organization of government under the constitution.
The exercise of such a power, however, exhibits the judicial
department of government as testing deliberate measures of a
body strictly coordinate with itself, and equally sworn to obey
an ordinance allowed to be supreme and controlling, and this
apparent check upon the legislature, while long rendered
familiar to all by usage, still, at times, seems an unusual
feature in our policy, marking it, by general consent, as sui
generis in the history of constitutional jurisprudence. When-
ever, indeed, a national statute arousing widespread interest is
declared by the judiciary to be beyond the capacity of Congress
.to pass, and hence void, there are seldom lacking those who
consider such a verdict a manifest interference with popular
will as expressed through its legitimate channel-the legislature.
That these views are, nevertheless, without adequate founda-
tion, is clearly announced by the judgment in .&farbury v.
Madison,1 where the doctrine in question is said to be destitute
of novelty and necessarily existent under every form of govern-
ment limited by organic law. It will be the aim of the follow-
ing pages to show that this position was consistently maintained
by our national judges from the very beginning; of development,
in any proper sense of that term, the records of the court exhibit
no trace.
February 14, 1794, we find the Supreme Court denying a
motion made on behalf of one John Chandler, a citizen of
Connecticut, for a writ of mandamus intended to compel
General Henry Knox, Secretary of War, to place Chandler's
name upon the invalid pension list, in conformity with a report
filed by the judges of the United States Circuit Court at Hart-
ford, approving Chandler's claim pursuant to jurisdiction vested
x. i Cranch x37, 177.
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in them by act of Congress passed March 23, ;792. While this
action on the part of the court, practically setting aside a plan
for the relief of veterans, and one which had been carefully
outlined by the national legislature, emphasized in the clearest
manner possible both the limited nature of congressional legis-
lative functions and the rdle to be assumed by the judicial
branch of government in determining, as occasion might arise,
when constitutional limitations should become enforceable, the
matter does not appear to have caused great surprise or serious
opposition; on the contrary, both President Washington and
Congress seem to have at once acquiesced, and a new plan
for the relief of applicants for pensions was speedily carried
into effect in such a manner as to be devoid of the formal
objections inducing the court's decision. For such a judicial
attitude, indeed, all parties may be said to have been amply
prepared, since the judges had already, on more than one
occasion, given voice to a determination not to be easily
weakened, that the eonstiwio should form a sure and ultimate
guide in all matters pertaining to their province. In accordance
with this view it was that in the autumn of the same year in
which the court first met in the city of New York for the
hearing of causes (x79o), it did not hesitate, in reply to an
inquiry from Washington, to criticise sharply, the judiciary act
passed by Congress in the previous year-September 24, 1789-
saying: "On comparing this act with the constitution, we per-
ceive deviations which in our opinion are important"; and the
judges proceeded to add that the circuit system outlined by
Congress essentially varied, in their estimation, the constitu-
tional judicial plan, since it was evident that, save in two
classes of causes, the constitution had intended the Supreme
Court to be a forum of final resort only; whereas the legislative
scheme, which imposed on the Supreme Court justices origi-
nal cognizance at circuit in a vast number of cases, went far
beyond the theory of those who had framed the new order of
government2 . Again, when, in the summer of 1793, the Genet
dxcitement was at its height, the judges declined to furnish
Washington with their opinion touching our obligations under
the treaties with France: "They considered themselves," says
Marshallg "merely as constituting a legal tribunal for the
decision of controversies brought before them in legal form;
2. Story, Comm. on the Const. 1579 and Note; McCree's Life of IredeU,
2, 292; and Washington to Thomas Johnson, Spark's Washington, 1o, 182.
3. Life of Washington, Vol. s, page ioB; Story, Comm. IS7r and Note.
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those gentlemen deemed it improper to enter the field of
politics by declaring their opinion on questions not going out
of the case before them." These conceptions imputed to our
earliest judges by Marshall, writing in x807, were afterwards
elaborated by him in the case of Osborn v. the United States
Bank at February term, I824. 4
The feature rendering the pension legislation constitutionally
objectionable lay in the fact that Congress had, in effect, so ar-
ranged the method of application on the part of the invalids, that
the Secretary of War possessed a revisory function touching the
action of the circuit judges whose findings were to be submitted to
the Secretary-he having the power, wherever he should "have
cause to suspect imposition or mistake, . . . to withhold
the name of an applicant from the pension list, and make
report of the same to Congress at their next session." 5 Within
a few weeks after the passage of the act the circuit court at
Philadelphia flatly declined to entertain jurisdiction of an
application made by one Hayburn, and in justification of their
action the judges addressed a letter to Washington declaring
that since they were bound by oath to support the constitution,
and since that instrument intended to vest the national judicial
power in courts-which bodies are intended to proceed in a
judicial manner only-they found themselves unable to assume
jurisdiction under the act of March 23, 1792, for the reason
that a power of revision being therein given to the Secretary
and Congress, the judicial department, should it obey the act,
would part with the independence unquestionably contemplated
in its creation. Similar sentiments were informally transmitted
to Washington by the circuit judges sitting at New York, and
at Newbern, N. C., and these various communications_ were
laid before Congress by the President,6 with the result that
Congress afterward modified the plan as we have already
noted. Some of the justices, however, agreed that while they
could not take judicial action in the matter of pension claims,
they might nevertheless proceed as commissioners, though it is
plain that the position assigned to the Secretary of War was
far from agreeable to any court: "We had two jury cases at
4. 9 Wheaton 738, 819; theletter of Jefferson, Sec'y of State, to the Judges,
and their replies in July and August, x793, are given in Vol. 3 of Jay's Letters,
page 486.
S. i U. S. Stat. at large 244.
6. Messages and Papers of the Presidents,Vol. i, pages 123, 133, 2 Dallas,
page 41o, Note.
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Trenton," wrote Cushing to Jay, October 23, 17'§2, "and there
we took up the matter of invalids-there being no determina-
tion upon the subject in that district before, the judges not
having the statutes there last term. Mr. Morris was strong in
favor and I was not opposing; so we acted as commissioners
and sent our certificates accordingly (without making any
entry in the book about it) to the Supreme Secretary of War.' ' 7
In the preceding month, Iredell found himself holding the
circuit court for Connecticut at Hartford, and here it was that
Chandler applied to him and to the local district judge-Law-
to be put on the invalid pension list: "We have had a great
deal of business to do here," wrote he, "particularly as I have
reconciled myself to the propriety of doing invalid business out
of court. Judge Wilson altogether declines to." The claim
of Chandler was approved by Iredell and Law but failed to
gain allowance at the hands of General Knox. Meantime,
February 28, 1793, a fresh act was passed by Congress provid-
ing that only the evidence in pension applications should be
taken before the judges who are directed by the act to "transmit
a list of such claims, accompanied by the evidence herein
directed, to the Secretary of the Department of War in order
that the same may be compared with the muster rolls and other
documents in his office; and the said Secretary shall make a
statement of the cases of the said claimants to Congress with
such circumstances and remarks as may be necessary in order
to enable them to take such order therein as they may judge
proper-no person not on the pension list before March 23,
1792, shall be entitled to a pension who shall not have com-
-iled with the rules and regulations herein prescribed, saving,
however, to all persons all and singular their rights founded
upon legal adjudications under the act . . . it shall be the
duty of the Secretary at War in conjunction with the Attorney
General to take such measures as may be necessary to obtain
an adjudication of the Supreme Court of the United States on
the validity of any such rights claimed under the act aforesaid
by the determination of certain persons styling themselves
commissioners. " 9  In pursuance of this last-named require-
ment, the Attorney General attempted at the following August
term of court to settle the question of validity by a motion for
a mandamus directed to the Secretary to compel him to place on
7. Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay, 3, 449-450.
8. Iredell to his wife, September 3o, x792; McCree's Iredell, 2, 361.
g. i U. S. Stat. at large, page 324.
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the pension list such names, approved by the judges at circuit,
as the Secretary had disallowed. But this general method
being deemed too -vague by the judges, nothing was accom-
plished. Six months later-February 5, i 7 9 4-Chandler's case,
accordingly, was brought before the Supreme Court on its
individual merits. A complete account of the proceedings is
given by Mr. S. W. Dana, a prominent member of the Connec-
ticut bar of that day and a graduate of Yale College, in his
remarkable speech in opposition to the repeal of the Judiciary
Act of x8oi, delivered in the House of Representatives, March
i, 1802.10 "I have," said Mr. Dana, "an extract from the
minutes of the Supreme Court certified by the clerk of the
court:
"Wednesday, February 5 th, 7794. Present: The honorable
John Jay, Chief Justice; William Cushing, James Wilson, John
Blair, and William Paterson, Associate Justices.
"Mr. Edmond, of counsel for John Chandler, a citizen of
the State of Connecticut, this day moved for a manda2us to the
Secretary of War for the purpose of directing him to cause the
said John Chandler to be put on the pension list of the United
States as an invalid pensioner conformably to the order and
adjudication of the Hon. James Iredell and Richard Law,
Esq'rs, judges of the circuit court of the United States.
"The court informed Mr. Edmond that when the trial of
the cause now before the court should be finished they would
hear him in support of his motion.
"Friday, February 7, 1794, the court proceeded to hear Mr.
Edmond on the subject of his motion made on the 5th inst.,
and agreed to hold the same under advisement.
"Thursday, February x3, 1794, the court proceeded to hear
the argument of counsel on the motion of Mr. Edmond for a
mandamus to the Secretary of War, made on Wednesday the
5 th inst.
"Friday, February x4 th, x794, the court having taken into
consideration the motion of Mr. Edmond, of the 5th inst. and
having considered the two acts of Congress relating to the
same, are of opinion that a mandamus cannot issue to the Secre-
tary of War for the purpose expressed in said motion."
The judiciary act of i8ox, following that of 1789, con-
tained a clause conferring upon the Supreme Court power to
issue the writ of mandamus in cases warranted by the princi-
ples and usages of law. This clause had been attacked on
February 17, 1802, by Mr. Thomas T. Davis of Kentucky, who
declared: "But it is said the law of last session is admitted to
be constitutional and that we have no power to repeal it. Look
xo. Annals 7th Congress, ist Session, pages go3-go4.
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at the second section of this law,II and compare it with the
constitution, and no candid man will declare it constitutional.
The original jurisdiction given by that section to the judges of
the Supreme Court exceeds those intended by the constitu-
tion." "Here," adds the reporter, "Mr. Davis read the law
and constitution." 12 The point thus raised was, of course, pre-
cisely that involved in the celebrated application of William
Marbury, then pending before the Supreme Couft, for a manda-
mus to compel the delivery to him by Secretary Madison, of
the commission which had been signed by President Adams
and sealed by Chief Justice Marshall as acting Secretary of
State, appointing Marbury a justice of the peace for Washing-
ton County in the District of Columbia, and which commission
had been by order of President Jefferson, who took office the
day succeeding that on which the commission was sealed,
retained in the Secretary's office. Mr. Dana, an advocate of
the rightfulness of Marbury's application, has left us a contem-
porary account of the whole case, and it was in connection with
this that he instanced the Chandler decision for the purpose of
showing that a writ of mandamus might properly issue from the
Supreme Court to a high officer of government, and might
have issued in Chandler's case but for the unconstitutionality
of the act of 1792, there having evidently been no question
made on Mr. Edmond's motion touching the point upon which
Marbury's case was afterward made to turn by the Supreme
Court and which had been so clearly announced by Mr. Davis,
viz., that the court lacked the power under the constitution to
issue the writ in the exercise of its original jurisdiction-such
jurisdiction being confined by the constitution to cases where a
state of the union or the representatives of a foreign government
may be parties. This feature, however, was not overlooked by
Mr. Dana who, like Ex-Attorney General Lee, in his argument
before the court on behalf of Marbury, took the ground that
mandamus, in such a case, is an appellate proceeding. The
judges, as we know, when delivering their opinion in Mar-
bury's case, February 24, 1803, affirmed, however, that man-
damus to a government officer must be considered as original
in character and therefore beyond the court's competence
on constitutional grounds. Thus it was that Chief Justice
Marshall, when delivering the opinion of the court, expressly
alluded to the Chandler application for a mandamus to the
ii. Which section contained the clause touching mandamus.
I2. Annals, 1. c.
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Secretary of War, for the purpose of showing, precisely as
Mr. Dana did the previous year, that mandamus offered an
appropriate remedy for the case at bar, though as the Chief
Justice afterwards showed, the court lacked the power to issue
the writ. It should be remembered, too, that Justices Paterson
and Cushing, who had sat in the Chandler case, were also mem-
bers of the court which unanimously decided -against Marbury's
application. In both instances the applications were dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction-on the part of the circuit court, in the
earlier case, under an act of Congress unconstitutional because
conferring power not judicial, and in the later case because an
act of Congress which conferred upon the Supreme Court itself
power to entertain such an application as the one at bar,
widened the original cognizance of the court in a manner at
variance with the constitution and, therefore, void. Referring
to Chandler's case, Chief-Justice Marshall said: 1 "When the
subject was brought before the court, the decision was, not
that a mandamus would not lie to the head of the department
directing him to perform an act enjoined by law in the per-
formance of which an individual had a vested interest; but that
a mandamus ought not to issue in that case; the decision
necessarily to be made if the report of the commisssioners did
not confer on the applicant a legal right. The judgment in
that case is understood to have decided the merits of all claims
of that description; and the persons, on the report of the com-
misssioners, found it necessary to pursue the mode prescribed
by the law subsequent to that which had been deemed uncon-
stitutional, in order to place themselves on the pension list."
Here the court, two members of which, as we have noted, had sat
in the Chandler case, expressly declares that in 1794 it had dis-
missed Edmond's motion for mandamus by reason of the uncon-
stitutionality of the act upon which it was founded. This, then..
is certainly the first case in which the Supreme Court took the
attitude in question; as such it should claim a preeminent place
in our legal annals, although it has lain practically neglected
by writers on constitutional subjects; Coxe, indeed, in his
comprehensive work, 14 doubts whether the case as mentioned
by Chief-Justice Marshall really existed.
The principle upon which the Pennsylvania Circuit Court
denied Hayburn's application and the Sujpreme Court after-
wards dismissed that of Chandler viz., that the act of Congress
x3. x Cranch x72.
14. An Essay on Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, pp. 16,17.
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called upon the judges to exercise a power not judidially
enforceable, has been illustrated in many cases of later date, a
recent one being that of the District of Columbia v. Eslin, decided
November 3, 1901- 15
Three days after the determination made in Chandler's
case, the well-known suit of the United States v. Yale Todd was
decided in favor of the government. This suit, the details of
which are given by Mr. Dana in the address already alluded
to and which are also preserved in the familiar note
appended to Ferreira's case, was brought in pursuance of
the provisions of the act of February 28, 1793, above cited,
in order to test the validity of decisions made by the
judges as commissioners, and one Yale Todd, who had
received at the New Haven circuit an allowance of pension
money through the favorable report of the judges con-
firmed by the Secretary of War, was selected as a defendant
in order to settle the entire matter. Judgment passing
for the United States was equivalent, as remarked in the
note to Ferreira's case, to a declaration,-if taken in connec-
tion with the prior determinations and informal opinions at
circuit,-that the pension legislation as first outlined by Con-
gress was unconstitutional and void, although as the note states,
the question touching the court's capacity to entertain the suit
itself as an original proceeding was not considered. This case,
then, forms the second instance in which the court decided against
the.validity of an act of the national legislature: "We here
find," said Mr. Dana,' 6 "that the authority of the judges to
decide 'questions arising under the constitution was fully
recognized. The first President of the United States, the Con-
gress, and the judges of the Supreme Court, all sanctioned the
opinion by their official proceedings, and it is well known that
many of them were members of the general convention or of
state conventions which agreed to the constitution . . . the
principle, therefore, which is now disputed, has been settled
for years. It is the established principle of the constitution."1
7
A few days earlier-February 20, 18o2-Mr. Bayard of
Delaware hail discussed the same doctrine at length, and had
pointed out, as did the judges afterwards in Marbury's case, that
the principle in question is plainly recognized in the constitu-
tion itself, which' instrument-article 3, section 2-"expressly
IS. 183 U. S. 62, 66.
i6. Loc. cit.
17. Annals 7th Congress, ist Session, pages 725, 726.
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extends the judicial power to all the cases arising under the
constitution, the laws, etc. The provision in the second clause
of the 6th article leaves nothing to doubt: 'This constitution,
and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pur-
suance thereof, etc., shall be the supreme law of the land.'
The constitution is absolutely the supreme law. Not so the
acts of the legislature. Such only are the law of the land as are
made in pursuance of the constitution." Here Mr. Bayard read
section 25 of the Judiciary Act of i729, providing that a final
judgment in a state court where the validity of a treaty or
statute of The union is drawn in question, "may be reexamined
in the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of error."
"Thus, as early as the year 1789," continued Mr. Bayard,
"among the first acts of the government, the legislature explic-
itly recognized the right of a state court to declare a treaty, a
statute, or authority exercised under the United States, void,
subject to the revision of the Supreme Court of the United
States; and it has expressly given the final power to the
Supreme Court to affirm a judgment which is against the
validity either of a treaty, statute or an authority of the govern-
ment. I humbly trust, Mr. Chairman, that I have given
abundant proofs from the nature of our government, from the
language of the constitution, and from legislative acknowledg-
ment, that the judges of our courts have the power to judge and
determine upon the constitutionality of our laws." Mr. Bayard
also, during the same address, used the striking illustration,
afterwards employed in nearly the same words by Chief Justice
Marshall. when writing the opinion in Marbury's case, that
since Congress is expressly prohibited by the constitution
from doing certain things; as, for example, it may not pass a
bill of attainder, ex postfacto law, etc. :-now, if, in point of
fact, the legislature actually passes such a law, and one is con-
demned under it, what decision shall a court render having
before it the constitution and the law of a co~rdinate branch of
government: "the courts are bound to decide that they have
only the alternative of pronouncing the law or the constitution
invalid. It is left to them only to say that the law vacates the
constitution, or the constitution avoids the law." A similar
illustration had been employed with striking effect by Nelson
and Tucker, JJ., in the notable case of Kamper v. Hawkins,
determined by the General Court of Virginia November x6,
1793, it being the latter judge who then announced "that the
constitution is a rule to all the departments of the government,
to the judiciary, as well as to the legislature."
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Bearing in mind the determinations made in 1794, we are
not surprised to find Mr. Justice Paterson at April term, 1795,
when delivering his charge to the jury in the celebrated
Wyoming case of Vankorne's Lessee v. Dorrance in the Circuit
Court of the United States at Philadelphia, maintaining with
great firmness the doctrine of judicial power to pass upon an
act of a state legislature necessarily brought before the court in
a cause at bar. In neither the Chandler nor Todd cases was
there any formal opinion filed; in the former, we have for-
tunately, in addition to the brief announcement of the decision,
a suggestion of the basis upon which it was made-namely, the
statute of Congress as incompetent to sustain the rights
claimed under it; whence it follows that its operation was con-
sidered at variance with constitutional principles. BtLt in the
Wyoming case, Paterson elaborates at considerable length the
underlying reasons which must support every such determina-
tion; the constitution-strictly organic-is paramount, as being
the work of the people in its sovereign and wholly unlimited
capacity, whereas legislation springs from a derivative and
hence subordinate will-that of the state government created
by basic law; acts of this latter body, if repugnant to the
higher regulation, must, therefore, be void; this is shown
by the fact that in all constitutions there are certain
reservations - in that of Pennsylvania, freedom of worship
freedom of elections, trial by jury, etc.; where a legisla-
ture endeavors to violate such 'fundamental provisions, "it
will be the duty of the court to adhere to the constitution
and to declare ,the act null and void"; moreover, judges are
sworn to support the constitution, and it thus becomes a
rule by which they, as well as the legislature, are to be gov-
erned; hence the constitution "contains the permanent will of
the people, and is the supreme law of the land."' 8 The same
principles were taken up in 31798 by Iredell, J., in Calder v.Bull, 1 9
and applied to the national constitution. When Chief-Justice
Marshall came to write the opinion in Marbury's case, he did,
indeed, little more, when treating the constitutional aspects of
the matter, than sum up these positions of Paterson and Iredell.
It should be carefully noted, however, that Paterson himself
had merely condensed, though in most brilliant fashion, the
remarkable demonstration outlined by the judges of the Virginia
general court when delivering their opinions seriatim in the
xS. 2 Dallas 304, 308.
xg. 3 Dallas 386, 399.
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great case of Kamper v. Hawkins in November, 1793.20 The
Virginia judges, moreover, had already exhibited precisely the
same firm attitude touching their duty in questions between
statute and constitution, destined to more notable illustration a
little later on the part of the national judiciary; the Virginia
court had not hesitated in 1788 to arraign the state legisla-
ture for its circuit court plan, 2 1 and although the law makers
had yielded at the time and modified the judiciary system,
nevertheless, a fresh transgression of constitutional principles,
by endeavoring to unite common law and equity powers in
a single tribunal, served to bring on the declarations in
Kai per v. Hawkins which served as a never-fdiling fountain
of judicial inspiration to after years.
The demonstration given by Mr. Justice Paterson showing,
the logically necessary nature of judicial duty where there
appeared a legislative impairment of a distinct reservation
in a constitution, formed the foundation of two notable
decisions very early in the history of our state independence,
and in both of these cases legislative acts abridging trial by
jury were held powerless, in New Jersey and Rhode Island
to confer jurisdiction, and were thus, judicially, set aside. In
each case we are strongly reminded of the charter origin of
American constitutions: the New Jersey case2 2 turned upon a
reservation of trial by jury in the instrument drafted by the
provincial congress at Burlington July 2, 1776-Paterson being
secretary of the convention-and which instrument declares that
"we, the representatives of the Colony of New Jersey,
have . . . agreed upon a set of charter rights and the
form of a constitution. That the common law of England as
well as so much of the statute law as has heretofore practiced
in this colony, shall still remain in force until they shall be
altered by a future law of the legislature, such parts only
excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained
in this charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury
shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this colony, with-
out repeal, forever." In the Rhode Island case-Trevett v.
2o. Brockenbrough & Holmes, Virginia Cases, i, 20, seg.
21. Case of the Judges, 4 Call, i, 135; summarized by Randolph, February
20, 1802; Ann. of 7th Cong., ist Sess., page 655.
22. Holmes v. Walton, noticed by Mr. Chief Justice Kirkpatrick in his
opinion in State v. ParkAurst, May term X804, 4 Halsted, N. J. Law 443, 444;
the case is considered in detail by Dr. Austin Scott in the American Histori-
cal Review for April, 1899, page 456, se!7.
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Weeden 2 3-a statute disregarded by the judges withdrew trial
by jury altogether, and thus became contradictory, as it was
held, to the Royal Charter of x663, which permitted legislation
on the part of the colonists not repugnant to the law of England:
now trial by jury may well be thought a part of that law. At
the Revolution, Rhode Island, like Connecticut, was content
with the adoption of its ancient charter as the new state funda-
mental law; and while neither in New Jersey, Rhode Island
nor Conecticut were the revolutionary constitutions ratified by
the people at large, they, nevertheless, through acquiescence
on the people's part, must be considered as having formed true
fundamental written constitutions in the fullest acceptation of
that term.2 4  The North Carolina instances of similar import
are reviewed by Ruffin, C. J., in Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Devereux
I, 15 . x6; the Chief-Justice here cites the important one-
anonymous-of the State v. - 5, a case which has been quite
neglected by our constitutional writers but which contains,
nevertheless, an invaluable exposition of constitutional prin-
ciples.
Passing by other determinations, we need only notice here
the significant utterance of Chief Justice Marshall, a few weeks
only prior to .Afarbury v. Madison, in which, sitting at the North
Carolina circuit, he clearly announced the necessary limitations
of state legislative power and the authority of the judges in
constitutional questions.
2 6
In his notable charge in Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, Mr.
Justice Paterson took occasion to carefully distinguish the
power of Parliament as a legislature possessing truly sovereign
capacity; if the intent of this assembly be once judicially ascer-
tained, its will, thus made known, cannot be disputed, but must
be obeyed;27 "in America," continues the learned justice,
23. Story, Comm. 488; Annals of Congress, February 24, 1802, page 727;
Trial of R. I. Judges, by J. Winslow, N. Y. 1887; and many recent collections
of cases.
24. State v. Parkhurst, subra; Starr v. Pease, 8 Conn. 541, 547; Conn.
Public Records, Vol. i, page 31, where the adoption of the charter on October
10, 1776, as the new State constitution, is recounted.
25. z Haywood 29, determined in 1794.
26. Ogden v. Witherspoon, 2 Haywood 227.
27. 2 Dallas 307; cf. Blacks. Comm. 9i. On the other hand, the con-
tention in Coke's report of Dr. Bookham's case, and in Hobart's report of
Day v. Savage, (8 Rep. ix8 a; Hob. 87) touching judicial duty to decline
recognition of a statute at clear variance with natural justice, goes no farther
than to announce that judges will not impute to the legislature such a pur-
pose; such was the ground of decision by the Mayor's Court of New York in
1784, in Rutgers v. Waddington. Cf. also Beasly, C. J., in Schroder v.
Ehlers, 2 Vroom (3z N. J. L.) 44, 49; r Kent. Comm. 448, seg.
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"the case is widely different: every state in the Union has its
constitution reduced to written exactitude and precision.
Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet, in this, there
can be no doubt that every act of the legislature, repugnant to
the constitution, is absolutely void."
In Great Britain, however, the legislature derives its
authority from no express grant of the nation conferring a
measured capacity, but. on the contrary, Crown, Lords and
Commons - in Parliament - directly represent the constitu-
tional force of the kingdom, and are thus without legal
restraint; their power finds a parallel in the state conven-
tions, in the United States, called to vote on changes in the
national constitution. "It is not to be doubted," said Lord
Holt in 1704, in his celebrated pronouncement in Ashby v. White,
"that the commons of England have a great and considerable
right in the government, and a share in the legislative, without
whom no law passes; but because of their vast numbers this
right is not exercisable by them in their proper persons, and
therefore by the constitution of England, it has been directed,
that it should be exercised by representatives, chosen by and
out of themselves, who have the whole right of all the commons
of England vested in them." 28  "And to be short," says Sir
Thomas Smith, Regius Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge,
in the days of Henry the Eighth, 2 9 "all that ever the people of
Rome might doe, either Centuriatis Comitiis or Tributis, the
same may be done by the Parliament of England; which repre-
senteth, and hath the power of the whole realm, both the head
and bodie. For every Englishman is intended to be present,
either in person or by procuration and atturny, of what pre-
heminence, state, dignitie or qualitie soever hee be, from, the
Prince (be he King or Queene) to the lowest person of Eng-
land. And the consent of the Parliament is taken to be every
man's consent."
There is here, manifestly, no scope for a judicial testing
of legislation by terms of any organic pattern; but in the
case of a chartered government authorized by stvereignty, the
matter stands far otherwise. Every act of the derivative and
limited organization may, plainly, be tried by the rule which
limits it; the office of thejude, too, now becomes indispensable
should a contest arise between legislation enacted by the law-
28. 2 Ld. Raymond 938; cf. Hardwicke C. J., to the same effect in Mid-
dleton v. Crofts, in 1736; 2 Atkins, Appendix, 650-654.
29. De Ref2 ublica Anglorum, Chap. XXIV.
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makers whose power springs from the charter, and the funda-
mental restrictions laid down on the part of the sovereign, and
the ju~dicial faculty to be evoked precisely answers to Pufen-
dorf's definition: potestas Judiciaria, cufus est lites dvium cognoscere
et decidere singulorumque facta, quae legibus contraria arguuntur,
ac poenam legibus convenientem dictitare.3 0  It is, accordingly,
where the by-laws of a chartered town is challenged for non-
conformity to the royal or parliamentary act erecting it, that
judges properly appear as final interpreters of constitutional
provisions: "but sure we may determine on a charter granted
by the King," said Lord Holt, in Ashby v. White;" and in a
later case the judges say: "neither can a by-law explain a
charter, for that must be done by the judges." 81
At Rome, though the assembly, as Sir Thomas Smith well
says, is the constitutional master, a like principle, touching sub-
ordinate legislation,is easily discerned. The people's will,indeed,
expressed in a lex, is subject in earlier days to a species of formal
control, by the patrician section of the senate, through the patrum
auctoritas-and later to a trial before the augurs, at the senate's
instigation, where a vitium is alleged-nevertheless there is
here no over-law to which appeal may be made. In revolu-
tionary days, likewise, the senate claims-though quite without
legal foundation - a dispensing power; hence Cicero is made
to say in the apochryphal de domo: "senatus quidem, cujus est
gravissimum judicium deajure legum." 8 2  But in the Roman
provincial system there clearly existed a genuine charter law
illustrating in striking fashion the doctrines under examination.
The lex provindae, promulgated by a commanding general at the
30. Dejure Naturae et Gentium, VII, IV, 4.
31. Rex v. the Mfayor of Weymouth, 7 Modern 373; affirmed on appeal to
the Lords. December i, x742, Brown's cases in Parl., 2, 304.
32. Cicero de doMo 27, 7r. The hatrum auctoritas is summarized by
Schiller-Rdmische Altertumer-in Miller's Handbuch, Vol. 4, pt. 2, pages
128, 131, etc.; and in Smith's .Dictionary of Greek aud Roman Antiuities,
I, 247-256. In the de domo Cicero is speaking of the senate's "opinion touch-
ing the validity of statutes;" this phrase is misapprehended by Coxe-Judie.
Power and Unconst. Legis., page nxo-who renders de jure legum: "con-
cerning the law of laws." Senatorial interference with measures of the
comitia is considered in much detail by Mommsen-Rdmisches Staatsrecht,
3, 363, seq; he says of the senate's assumption to exercise a revisory function
in legislation: allerdings -ehdren alle diese Vorgdnge der Revolutionse-
fioche an; der wilden Gesetzmacherez derselben wird durch Fine niche
minder wiiste Cassationsfirocedur gesteuert. Flaminius, indeed, in 218 B.
C. flatly defied both augurs and senate when a vitium in his election as consul
was announced.
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reduction of a province, together with local charters or special
enactments for the administration of districts and towns,
offer familiar examples; as do also the charters of so-called
"free" cities self-governed, in subjection, however, to an explicit
law graven upon a tablet set up in Rome and in the civitas
federata itself. Of this latter description was the charter of
Termessus in Pisidia, whose citizens might pass such by-laws
as they pleased "quod advorsus hanc legem non fiat"; s3 notable
instances of provincial regulations are those promulgated in
x67 B.C. by Anicius at Scodra, dividing Illyria; and by Aemilius
Paulus at Amphipolis, for Macedonia. Livy carefully dis-
tinguishes the provincial constitution-formula-from the lex,
intended to be of local application and based on the docu-
ments-literae-of individual communities: Liv. 45, 26, x5; 29,
1; 30, 8; 31, 1; Pliny has left us, in his correspondence
with Trajan, a vivid picture of frequent appeals to the emperor
for judicial construction of privileges claimed by these limited
governments.8 4 At Athens, we may notice, the people is equally
supreme, though legislation-vooOEola-comes into existence
not through the assembly but by means of committees
appointed ad hoc from the jurymen sworn for a current year,
and whose functions, though leaning toward judicial procedure,
were, in essence, deliberative. The annual revision of the code
from the standpoint of expediency at the first assembly-
Julv-August-and the formal scrutiny on the part of law-
officers-ezouoe'raz-whose action was known as the straight-
ening of the laws-6zcp6ao6zT rcv vo',uov-were equally in-
tended to preserve harmony in existent regulations, while the
celebrated process for a trial upon the ground of defect in form,
to which a law or temporary decree-07z'nay-might be sub-
jected-lpayv gaov y'pterqq-axhibits, not a test by any
standard imposed by a power above the legislators who had
framed the act, but merely the people in another capacity deter-
mining whether its own deed measured up to a standard set
and also changeable by itself: 0eapoe'rq/, ijXzaorI5 and
toza~Yr'4 alike represented sovereignty, and the parallels
33. Bruns, Fontesfur. Rom. Ant. (ed. 1893), i, 94.
34. Marquardt, Rdmische Staatserwaltung x, 65, sq ., has brought to-
gether all the references touching this interesting subject; in Vespasian's time,
it appears, there were some three thousand of these law-tablets extant at
Rome in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. From the severe prohibitions of
the lex coloniae Genetivae (Bruns, 123, 13o,) it is plain that a proconsul's
duty, were a local act contravening the charter of foundation brought before
him at the assizes-conventus-would be to pronounce it void.
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occasionally drawn between Athenian and American systems
fail in completeness, though, again, as at Rome, the colonial
rigine offers suggestive analogies. 3 5
That the British municipal corporation with its charter and
by-laws was, constitutionally, reproduced on the west of the
Atlantic, became plain, however, at an early day, and a
glance at the remarkable development, during the eighteenth
century, of a distinct jurisprudence of by-laws in the court of
King's Bench will show the fundamental principles touching
the necessary relation of original and derivative legislative
action carefully elaborated. These doctrines, long familiar to
the common law, find their earliest leading expression in
colonial jurisprudence3 6 in the celebrated appeal of Winthrop
from a judgment of the Connecticut Superior Court; the cause
was determined by the Crown in Council February 15. 1728,
upon a report from a judicial committee comprising the two
Lord Chief Justices, the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the
Rolls, and many other notabilities. An act of the Connecticut
Assembly had attempted to vary the ancient common law rule
touching descent of real estate to the eldest son, and from its
operation in his own case Winthrop, in the phrase of the day,
"appealed home," and won his cause. The language of the
judgment is most suggestive: the act of assembly is "laid
before ther lordships" and, on comparison with the terms of
the Connecticut charter which forbade local legislation not in
conformity with the law of England, the act is held "not war-
ranted by the charter of that colony" and hence is adjudged
"null and void." This language we recognize as made familiar
in many an American constitutional decision since the days of
Marbury v. Mradison, where the act of Congress was held by the
judges "not warranted- by the constitution" and hence "null
and void."
35. The somewhat complicated machinery of legislation through sworn
committees is the device of the fourth century B. C.; earlier, the assembly
directly confirms a plan sketched by a committee of one, perhaps, or, at least
of a small number of chosen statesmen-the subject is best condensed in
Herman's Staatsaltertamer (6th ed.) 91. An outline of Greek legislative
theory in its constitutional aspects would prove a useful addition to our com-
parative constitutional literature.
36. In an article published in the Harvard Law Review for May, 19o5,
and after the above lines were written, Mr. Chauncey G. Parker has called
attention to the case of Basse v. Bellomont, tried before Lord Holt and
a jury in 17oo and exhibiting "the first discussion in a court of law of the con-
stitutionality of a colonial statute."
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Pitkin, writing in x828,8 7 gives an account of early appeals
to the council and instances Winthrop's case: "Theseappeals,"
says he, "brought into question, in England, the validity of
some of the laws in the charter colonies. This was particularly
the case in an appeal from the settlement of an estate in Con-
necticut in i727, in which the king and council decided that
the law of descents in that colony, which gave the female as
well as the male heirs, a part of the real estate, was null and
void, because repugnant to the laws of England, and therefore not
warranted by their charter.
"The law officers of the crown, in this case, insisted before
the council, that the powers of the corporation of Connecticut,
were limited merely to making by-laws for settling the forms
and ceremonies of government and magistracy, and for naming
and stating officers, and for distinguishing the several duties of
such officers, forms of oaths, etc., a power, they said, given to
every little corporation in England, but could never be con-
strued to extend to the making laws for dividing propberty and
the descent of real estate. "
Here the act of the colonial assembly is assigned to its true
place in the constitutional scale-that of a by-law ;8 B it is the
act of legislators whose power is limited and the extent of
which limitation is to be judicially determined whenever a case
involving the exercise of legislation under the charter comes
before a court. While the decision on Winthrop's appeal was
reversed by the Lords of the Council in i745, it seems probable
that this arose from the consideration, strongly urged in -rgu-
ment in the case of Phillips v. Savage in 1737-a controversy
brought up on appeal from a Massachusetts decision-that even
in England primogeniture cannot be held to be the unvarying
rule since the customs of gavelkind, borough-English, etc.,
37. History of the United States, 1, 123, seq.
38. In the federal convention, June 29, 1787, Madison declared that, as the
confederation then stood, state acts of assembly "in relation to the para-
mount law of the Confederacy, were analogous to that of by-laws to the
supreme law within a state." Despite, however, the fact that, constitutionally,
these acts were but by-laws, it will be well recollected that it was the practi-
cal impossibility of controlling, through the articles of confederation, the
defiance by states of our treaty obligations with Great Britain that led to the
insertion in the new constitution of the clause proclaiming treaties a part of
the supreme law; cf. Iredell J. in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dallas, at pages 276-277.
In his Law of the Constitution, Prof. Dicey (4th ed. page X41) compares an
act of Congress to the by-law of an English private corporation; this
resemblance was noticed by Williams, C. J. in Pratt vu. Allen, 13 Conn. 1x9,
125, June, 1839, citing 3 Tenn. R. 198.
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greatly modify it in certain localities; hence colonial policy
might be allowed similar deviations without conflicting with
the charter requirement of conformity to the common law. 8 9
The growth at Westminster Hall of a distinct body of
rules touching the limits of self-legislation in a town govern-
ment organized by charter, received an extraordinary impetus
at the very time when Winthrop's case was judicially deter-
mined, through the increase of what came to be known as
"select bodies" within the borough corporation itself, The
struggle for the control of parliamentary representation
became, necessarily, much simplified in many localities in case
it were posible to so narrow the governing body of boroughs
possessing the franchise that voting for members of Parliament
should be restricted to a very small and practically self-perpet-
uating order; this end was sought to be accomplished on the
part of borough legislators, through by-laws disqualifying from
eligibility to local office the greater portion of the borough
freemen, notwithstanding a chartered right possessed by these
latter of election if nominated by their corporate brethren. It
was in the many contests touching the validity of such by-laws
that the rules of which we have spoken became a settled
feature of common law doctrine; and in the process the
familiar terms afterward destined to characterize American
public law, received their first development: for charter we
have, under Lord Mansfield, constitution; the Common Council
is declared incompetent to pass a by-law inconsistent with the
constitution; and such a by-law, if found violating the constitu.
tion, is judicially pronounced "null and void." In the cele.
39. The papers in Winthrop's appeal are preserved in Vol. 4 of the 6th
series of the Mass. Hist. Society's Collections; at page 51i the later cases are
referred to; that of Pzill45s v. Savage appears in the proceedings of the
Society for October, i86o, page 79. Our constitutional indebtedness to the
colonial charter and the English trading company have been set forth on
many oocasions: cf. Mr. Brooks Adams'" The Embryo of a Commonwealth." in
the Atlantic Monthly for November, 1884; Mr. James Harvey Robinson, "The
Original and Derived Features of the Constitution," in Annals of the Am.
Acad. for Oct., i8go, and "The Genesis of a Written Constitution," Ann. for
April, I8gI. Many early cases are collected and commented upon in a note to
Quincy's Reports published at Boston in 1865; more complete is the article by
Mr. Meigs, of Philadelphia, in the Am. Law Rev., April, i885; also an article ixi
the same publication, Sept., i8gs. by Mr. R. L. Fowler, "Origin of the
Supreme Judicial Power in the Fed. Const.;" and articles by the late Prof.
Thayer, and by Mr. H. L. Carson and Mr. C. B. Elliott in the Am. Law Reg.,
the Pol. Sci. Quarterly, and Harvard Law Review.
THE CASE OF CHANDLER v. SECRETARY. 449
brated charter cause of Rex v. Durham,40 Ambler argues that
the by-laws must pursue the local constitution, just as our own
judges in Marbury's case drew attention to this requirement
touching an act of Congress which must be made "in pursuance
of the constitution." So the reasoning from theprohibitions of
a constitution-which forms so distinctive a feature in Kamper
v. Hawkins, Vankorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, and Marbury v. Zadi-
son-is employed with great force by Lord Mansfield in Rex v.
Cowle, at Trinity Term, 1759, 4 1 where the question at issue was
the power of the court under the Berwick charters to bring up
by certiorari a local indictment for assault; could the corpora-
tion hold itself not amenable to the court's jurisdiction, said
Lord Mansfield, it would present the case of a limited govern-
ment clothed with power knowing no bounds. In the leading
cases of Rex v. Spencer and Rex v. Cutbush,4 2 prior determina-
tions are collected and the principles we have noted are elab-
orated; in the cases on appeal to the House of Lords, preserved
in Brown's Reports of Cases in Parliament (Vol. II), there are
shown in detail some celebrated determinations which strik-
ingly remind us of American constitutional decisions. Indeed
the solicitude so persistently manifested by the earliest New
England colonists touching their charter rights, is easily seen
to be a direct inheritance from over sea taking its first rise in
English municipal life. Nor are we surprised to find the
General Assembly of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
on receipt of its royal charter, making an order "that the
Recorder be desired to attend this Court, and to carry and
recarry the Charter of this Court for the peruseall, while this
Assembly see cause.' ' 4 S In like manner the spirit of Connec-
ticut, and its determination that its laws should be constitu-
tional, is reflected in an order of the General Court at Hart-
ford, October 9, x662: "This Court doth order and hereby
declare all ye Lawes and orders of this Colony to stand in full
40. Preserved in Kenyon's Notes of Cases. The term constitution ap-
pears ordinarily in English law reports in its concrete sense as the equivalent
of ordinance or by-law, and is so employed in the Georgia charter of 1732.
In .684, however, it is used by the Privy Council, when criticising New
York's proposed charter, as signifying the charter itself, and with the precise
force familiar to our own terminology; cf. Docs. Rel. to the Col. Hist. of the
St. of . Y., Vol. 3, 358.
41. Burrow, 834, 836.
42. Burrow, 1828, 2204, seq.
43. Records of the Colony of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
Vol. 2, page 24,
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force and virtue unless any be cross to ye Tenour of our
Charter." 4 4  At the time of the Revolution, so firmly fixed,
despite much local objection, had the practice of "appealing
home" become, that the people of Delaware, in framing their
first constitution, expressly declared that their highest tribunal
should possess the jurisdiction formerly exercised "by the King
in Council under the old government." 45
Nor was Great Britain the sole theater upon which the prin-
ciple of local limited government, afterward destined to be
expanded on a vast scale in the United States in state and
national administrations, reached their earliest development
through judicial decision. In France the medieval charter, evi-
dencing the establishment of order, and hence known by the
suggestive title of institutio Pacis, r~gles de constitution, lettres de
fondation,-the town itself being termed ville de loi; villa se regente
per legem,-while not a veritable constitution, but rather the
germ only of law organic, must, nevertheless, be vindicated
through judicial construction either on the part of the local
magistrates-tchevins-of the locality from whose original
grant similar later charters have been patterned, or, in the last
resort before the royal judges-the Parlement de Paris;on occas-
ion, the King himself will hear the cause: in all such cases
charters are produced and by their side are laid the acts of
local legislation complained of; comparison is made and judg-
ment passes. When construing a charter the function of the
Parliament is strictlyiudidal and to be carefully distinguished
from the rdle afterward assumed by the mditres of criticising
legislation of the kingdom. Here, of course, their power con-
stitutionally failed. In determining charter contests they en-
force, as do judges in the United States, the mandates of
sovereignty witnessed in a rule of action intended to be control-
ling; but in attempting to pass, by reason of their duty to
register public laws, upon acts of the sovereign itself, they
transcended the judicial province. 4 6
In view of the foregoing, it is readily conceivable that when
Chief Justice Marshall undertook, in Marbury v, Mfadison. to
44. Public Records of Connecticut, Vol. i, page 387.
45. Constitution of 1776, Sect. 17.
46. Luchaire, Les Communes Franfaises, page iii, seg. and Histoire des
Institutions Monarchiques de la France, Vol. x, ch. 3, "organization de la
Cour du ROd; de Tocqueville, ' Ancien Rigime et la Rivolution, iog;
Aubert, Histoire du Parlement de Paris, cites many interesting charter
cases.
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show the reasons justifying the court in repelling jurisdiction
attempted to be conferred upon it by an act of Congress
deemed by the judges at variance with the national constitu-
tion, he should have been content with a comparatively brief
summary of leading positions, declaring, at the same time, the
essential universality of the doctrines announced, and that it
was merely necessary "to recognize certain principles long and
well established" to correctly apprehend the nature of the
decision which must be made. Nor need we greatly marvel
that these principles are not properly applicable to any
European polity since with them there is no inheritance of a
limited constitutional model, and the judiciary must merely
enforce, and cannot disregard, sovereign commands. Should
it attempt to exceed this field of duty, its action, like that of
the Parlement de Paris, becomes political and must expose
those who are guilty of so wide a departure from their
proper sphere to the same fate which overtook the picturesque
French tribunal.
Gordon E. Sherman.
